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THE PHILOSOPHER’S STONE
The Newsletter of the Philosophical Debate Group
On Animal Rights
from the GSU Philosophy Club
Peter Singer, a contemporary
ethicist and author of Animal
Liberation, considers the following
case. Suppose an infant is born with
irreversible brain damage. The child
will always remain a "human
vegetable," unable to communicate, to
recognize its surroundings or other
people, to act independently, or to
develop any kind of a self or a concept
of itself. The parents realize that the
situation is hopeless and, instead of
attempting to sustain the infant’s life
through costly medical procedures,
request that doctors painlessly
terminate the infant. Legally, of course,
doctors are unable to do so, and
furthermore many (most?) people
would be horrified at the prospect of
intentionally killing the infant.
But, as Singer points out, at
the same time these very same
individuals do not object to killing
animals. The question Singer poses is
what is the ethical justification for
these different judgments? Unlike the
severely brain-damaged infant, adult
chimpanzees, dogs, pigs, and members
of other species can interact with their
environments; they are self-aware; they
can problem solve; they are intelligent;
and they form empathetic bonds with
others. Despite our best medical
treatment, the brain-damaged infant
will never reach the intelligence level
of a dog. So is there a morally relevant
distinction between killing a braindamaged human infant and killing
animals? According to Singer, to
suppose that it is morally wrong to kill
the infant but morally permissible to
kill animals because the infant is a
member of the species homo sapiens,
whereas chimpanzees, dogs, and pigs
are not, is a blatant example of
speciesism. For Singer, speciesism is

the morally objectionable view that
species membership is morally relevant
in our treatment of sentient beings.
But, Singer explains, that the fact that I
am a member of a given species (homo
sapiens) is no more morally relevant
than my race. To treat creatures
differently because they are not
members of the species homo sapiens
is as morally objectionable as treating
humans differently because they are
not members of a certain race.
Speciesism is as bad as racism.
Singer doesn’t think that
someone who avoids speciesism has to
admit that it is just as wrong to kill a
pig as it is to kill a fully developed,
well-functioning human being. There
might be morally relevant
differences between pigs and humans
that allow us to kill pigs but not
humans. If we are to avoid speciesism,
however, we must recognize that all
beings who are similar in morally
relevant respects have an equal right to
life. But we should not assume that this
set of morally relevant properties will
pick out all and only members of our
species homo sapiens. If we recognize
that there are some properties that
make the lives of some beings (humans
and nonhumans) more valuable than
others, we may be forced to admit that
the lives of some animals are more
valuable than the lives of some
humans. For example, the life of a
chimpanzee may be more valuable
than the life of a severely retarded
human infant or someone in the
advances stages of Alzheimer’s. To
develop a right to life on the basis of a
set of morally relevant properties
means that an animal may have a
strong (if not stronger) claim to the
right to life than some human beings.
Finally, on this view, it may
turn out to be the case that
chimpanzees, dogs, and pigs have a
right to life which we egregiously
violate when we put them to sleep

when they are old and suffering. Or, it
may turn out to be the case that
severely mentally retarded or senile
human beings lack a strong right
to life and can therefore be killed for
the same reasons we now use when we
kill animals. Two philosophical/ethical
questions therefore emerge: first, what
are the morally relevant properties
(criteria) which grant a creature a right
to life; and, secondly, how should we
go about consistently applying these
criteria in our ethical treatment of
humans and animals alike?
Please join the Philosophical
Debate Group on Wednesday,
November 14 as we discuss the issue of
our ethical treatment of animals. Dr.
Weiss, professor of philosophy at
Georgia Southern, will be leading the
discussion. We will meet in Gamble
Hall in the Honor’s Lounge at 7:30.

Summaries of Previous
Meetings

by Eric Verhine
In the joyous month of
October the Philosophical Debate
Group held two pleasant meetings. Dr.
Larry Lesser of the Mathematics
Department led a meeting on October
10. The subject of his talk was the
relationship of philosophy to
mathematics, and of mathematics to
philosophy. Philosophy, since its
western inception in Greece, has
involved itself with mathematics.
Numerous “big-name” philosophers
were also mathematicians: Pythagoras,
Plato, Leibniz, Spinoza, Whitehead,
Frege, and Russell.
However, Dr. Lesser
approached the subject topically,
discussing and leading discussion over
some of the following issues. We
debated, and of course came to no
conclusion, about the nature of
mathematics, whether humans discover
it or create it. Some maintain that

mathematical laws are conceptual
translations of patterns found in the
physical universe. Others hold that
mathematical laws are merely
conceptual grids, frames, or
perspectives which thinkers place over
reality and which in fact make reality
what it is. Change the grid, as moderns
changed from the Newtonian to the
Einsteinian grid, and one gets not
simply a different understanding of
reality, but a whole new reality. This
problem of whether humans created or
discovered mathematics is, obviously,
a problem which mathematics itself
cannot solve. It is a philosophical
problem, and one’s solution to the
problem, in my opinion, depends
primarily on the overall worldview one
holds.
The group also discussed the
objectivity or absoluteness of
mathematical knowledge. In the
history of philosophy, thinkers have
often given mathematical truth a
special status as the unquestionably
absolute and objective truth. After all,
two plus two must always equal four,
right? Well, that is true, but it is only
true for one who accepts certain basic
assumptions that constitute traditional
western mathematics, assumptions that
are not themselves demonstrable. The
Austrian mathematician Kurt Godel, in
his famous “Incompleteness Theorem,”
showed that the propositions on which
any mathematical system is based are
themselves unprovable, since it is
possible to construct an axiomatic
proposition which is neither provable
nor unprovable within the system
itself.
Dr. Lesser also explained to
the group how modern theories of
statistics still play out the debate
between empiricists and rationalists.
He raised many questions regarding
values in mathematics and
mathematical teaching. We discussed
the presumed objectivity of statistics,
and noted how all presentations of
statistics depend on the subjective
choice, framing, and perspective of the
statistician. Dr. Lesser helped us to
consider how one should teach
mathematics, and pointed out that even
the teaching of mathematics is not
value free or neutral.

We had our second meeting
of October in Statesboro. This meeting
involved the Philosophy Clubs of
Georgia Southern and Savannah State,
as well as the gallant Philosophical
Debate Group. At this meeting Dr.
Nordenhaug gave a lecture entitled
“Reflections on Aristotle, Bureaucracy,
and Terrorism: Where Has All the
Virtue Gone?” Nordenhaug focused
primarily on the distinction between
Aristotle’s reasoning about ethics and
modern reasoning. Modern reasoning
about ethics is, he said,
methodological, concentrated on strict
rules of morality and on actions and
their consequences instead of persons.
Aristotle’s approach to ethics, called in
philosophy a “virtue ethic,”
concentrates on developing personal
character and with that a form of moral
wisdom that allows one to react well to
new situations. Bureaucrats usually
apply methodological reasoning about
ethics to the masses. When a problem
arises, the bureaucrat thinks that she
can solve it by the application of
general rule addressing the problem.
This form of solution, however, only
separates people from their actions,
and it fragments their ethical lives from
their actual existences. When people
no longer feel any connection to their
“virtues,” but see morality as the
mundane and mindless process of
following rules established by
authorities, they cease to be, according
to Aristotle, real human beings.
Moreover, the separation of self from
virtue and action causes psychological
turmoil, which may result in acts of
terrorism, such as those done by the
Unabomber. Thus, as Nordenhaug
noted, the bureaucrat and the terrorist
presuppose and fashion one another.

A Glimpse of the
Philosophical Future

by Eric Verhine
The approaching Spring
semester promises much for an eager,
fall weary Philosophical Debate
Group. I have prepared several topics
for the PDG to debate and discuss.
One topic is based on a book I read
written by Mark Seltzer called Wound
Culture. We will discuss why torn or

bloodied bodies and psyches so
enamor the American public, why
serial killers breathe so well in
American air, why so many people
tune into ER, and numerous other
American oddities. Another topic we
will discuss is that of meaning. Does
life have any meaning at all? What is
meaning? How can we justify our
claims either that life has meaning or
that it has no meaning? A third topic is
that of education. We will debate what
the nature and aims of (college)
education should be, and what practical
course of studies or curriculum would
serve students best. Other possible
topics include sexual ethics, social
determinism, the future of capitalism,
and certain feminist issues (or
whatever else my rootless mind settles
on).
However, all the
aforementioned topics are only
provisional. I would much prefer that
other students propose topics for
discussion, write the requisite article
for The Philosopher’s Stone, and then
lead the group discussion. If you have
a topic you would like to propose for
discussion, please contact me or Dr.
Nordenhaug. I would gladly, with
limitless and unwavering jollity, set
aside one of my topics for another
student’s topic.
In addition to PDG meetings
proper we have joint meetings with
Georgia Southern and Savannah State
to look forward to. I plan to work to
keep up this union (a president’s
promise). I have already asked Jack
Simmons from Savannah State to lead
one meeting next semester; then it will
be turn again for an Armstrong
professor (probably the jocose Dr. Joe
Weaver) to lead a meeting. Whatever
comes to be, keep up a keen and
systematic watch for each issue of The
Philosopher’s Stone.
If you have any comments,
criticisms, or contributions for The
Philosopher’s Stone, please send
them to either Eric Verhine or Dr.
Nordenhaug.
Eric Verhine (Editor)
everhine@yahoo.com
Dr. Erik Nordenhaug (Faculty
Advisor)
nordener@mail.armstrong.edu

